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Casenote

Defining Misappropriation: The Spousal
Duty of Loyalty and the Expectation of
Benefit*

In a case of first impression, SEC v. Yun,' the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit settled two disputed aspects of insidertrading liability.2 First, a duty of loyalty and confidentiality between
spouses may be shown if the spouses have a history or practice of
sharing and maintaining business confidences or, if in disclosing the
confidential information, the spouse breaches an agreement' to
maintain the other spouse's business confidences.' Second, in a
misappropriation theory of insider-trading liability action, the Securities
and Exchange Commission ("SEC") must prove that the misappropriator
expected to benefit from the tip.' The decision in Yun creates a split
with the Second Circuit Court of Appeals by more broadly defining the
spousal duty of loyalty and confidentiality.6 Furthermore, the court
increased the commonality between the classical theory and the
misappropriation theory of insider-trading liability by holding that the

*. I would like to express my gratitude to Professor D. Christopher Wells of the Walter
F. George School of Law, Mercer University, for his valuable guidance, expertise, and
encouragement.
1. 327 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 2003).
2. Id. at 1273, 1280.
3. The agreement must be an actual promise or explicit acceptance by one spouse to
keep confidential the material, nonpublic information (business confidence) shared by the
other spouse. Id. at 1273.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 1280.
6. Id. at 1272.
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SEC must prove that the misappropriating outsider or "tipper"7 had an
intent to benefit from the tip.8

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
During a post-nuptial9 division of assets, Donna Yun learned from her
husband, an executive at a subsidiary of Scholastic Corporation
("Scholastic"), that he believed the price of Scholastic shares would drop
following the upcoming earnings announcement. 10 Yun agreed to keep
this information confidential at the request of her husband." However,
while at work, Yun called her attorney to discuss her husband's
statement of assets. While Yun was on the phone, Jerry Burch, Yun's
business associate and friend, entered her small office to gather
materials for a client and heard Yun tell her attorney what her husband
had said about Scholastic's impending earnings announcement. Later
that evening, Yun, Burch, and another co-worker attended an awards
banquet together. 2 The next morning Burch called his broker to
request authority to purchase "put options"'3 in Scholastic based on

7. Tippers are people who give a tip or make a disclosure of confidential information
to tippees. Tippers were first found liable in Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983). In Dirks,
a classical theory of insider trading action, the Supreme Court held that insider-trading
liability may be extended to: (1) an insider who trades based upon confidential information,
and (2) an insider who tips (makes a disclosure of confidential information-rather than
trades) and expects to benefit from the tip. Id. at 659. In Yun, a misappropriation theory
of insider trading case, the Eleventh Circuit, seeking not to dichotomize the two theories
of insider-trading liability, similarly decided that (1) an outsider who trades based on
confidential information is liable, and (2) an outsider who tips (makes a disclosure of
confidential information-rather than trades) and expects to benefit from the tip is liable.
327 F.3d at 1279-80.
8. 327 F.3d at 1280.
9. 'Post-nuptial" means during the marriage. Id. at 1267.
10. While at a senior management retreat, Mr. Yun received information that
Scholastic was going to make a negative earnings announcement, which would likely result
in a decline in the market price of Scholastic shares. Id.
11. Yun's husband knew Yun would discuss the information with her attorney, but
Yun's husband expected Yun's attorney not to disclose the information. Id. at 1267-68 n.4.
12. Id. at 1268. The SEC contends that Yun disclosed the confidential information at
the cocktail party. SEC v. Yun, Litigation Release No. 17047, 75 S.E.C. Docket 985 (June
22, 2001). However, according to the parties, while at work, Burch overheard Yun's
telephone conversation with her attorney regarding the future of Scholastic stock, but
Burch only contacted his stockbroker after doing his own research-not after learning more
from Yun at the reception. Molly McDonough, The Walls Have Ears: Woman May Be
Liable for Stock Tip Overheard by Co-worker, 2 No. 17 A.B.A. J. E-REP. 3 (May 2, 2003).
13.
A put option is an option contract that gives the holder of the option the right to
sell a certain quantity of an underlying security to the writer of the option, at a
specified price up to a specified date. The value of a put increases as the price of

2004]

DEFINING MISAPPROPRIATION

1491

information he had obtained "at a cocktail party."14 Despite the
warnings of his broker regarding the risks of options trading and insider
trading prohibitions, Burch purchased Scholastic put options in an
amount equal to nearly half the value of his investment portfolio.
Scholastic announced that its earnings would be well below analysts'
expectations; Scholastic shares dropped. Burch sold his Scholastic put
options, realizing a profit of $269,000, a 1300 percent return on his
investment.15
After investigating the trades, the SEC brought an insider-trading
action against Yun and Burch as recipients of stock tips, alleging insider
trading in violation of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (the "Exchange Act"), 16 and Rule 10b-5. 7 The trial court denied

the stock decreases.
Yun, 327 F.3d at 1268 n.6.
14. Id. The disclosure of confidential information in this case could have been made
in two ways: (1) Yun could have inadvertently disclosed the confidential information to
Burch when Burch overheard Yun's telephone conversation with her attorney; or (2) Yun
could have voluntarily disclosed the confidential information to Burch at the awards
banquet. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the SEC, the nonmoving party,
the Eleventh Circuit accepted that the disclosure of confidential information was made
during the evening of the awards banquet. See id. at 1267, 1268; see also SEC v. Yun, 148
F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1296-97 (M.D. Fla. 2001) (finding an adequate foundation for a jury
determination that Yun voluntarily disclosed the confidential information at the awards
banquet); SEC v. Yun, 130 F. Supp. 2d 1348, 1357 (M.D. Fla. 2001) (finding that the SEC
presented sufficient evidence for a reasonable juror to conclude that Yun's disclosure of
confidential information was voluntary); cf SEC v. Switzer, 590 F. Supp. 756, 766 (W.D.
Okla. 1984) (finding that liability in insider trading cases cannot result from an
inadvertent disclosure when spouses discussed confidential information during a football
game and such information was inadvertently overheard by another spectator).
15. 327 F.3d at 1268.
16. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2001). Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange-. . . (b) To use or employ, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security ... , any manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the [SEC] may
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection
of investors.
Id.
17. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2002). Rule 10b-5, which was adopted pursuant to the SEC's
rulemaking authority given by section 10b of the Exchange Act, states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, [or] ...
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
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the motion for summary judgment filed by Yun and Burch.", At trial
the "jury found that [Yun and Burch] had 'violated [section] 10(b)' under
the 'misappropriation theory' of liability." 9 Following the jury verdict,
Yun and Burch moved for judgment as a matter of law or for a new
trial.20
The district court denied these motions. 2
Accordingly,
judgments were entered against Yun and Burch holding them jointly
liable for the profits generated by the prohibited trading, plus prejudgment interest, and individually liable for a penalty.22 Yun and Burch

appealed, arguing that the district court erred in denying their motions
for judgment as a matter of law and in instructing the jury on elements
of the misappropriation theory of insider-trading liability.2
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision denying
appellants' motions for judgment as a matter of law.24 However, the
court vacated the district court's judgment and remanded the case for a
new trial because the district court's jury instructions on the elements
of the misappropriation theory of liability were erroneous.25
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act makes insider trading unlawful by
prohibiting "any person" from "us[ing] or employ[ing], in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security..., any manipulative or deceptive
device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as
the [SEC] may prescribe."26 One purpose of section 10(b) is "to
eliminate 'use of inside information for personal advantage.'"2 7 To
violate section 10(b), an individual trading in securities with material,
nonpublic information must breach a fiduciary duty by failing to disclose
to the other trading party the confidential information or by failing to

in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.

Id.
18. Yun, 327 F.3d at 1267.
19. Id.
20. SEC v. Yun, 130 F. Supp. 2d 1348, 1349 (M.D. Fla. 2001).
21. Id. at 1357.
22. SEC v. Yun, 148 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1288 (M.D. Fla. 2001).
23. Yun, 327 F.3d at 1267.
24. Id. at 1282.
25. Id. At trial the jury instructions allowed the jury to find liability if Yun's disclosure

of confidential information to Burch was found to be "severely reckless." Id.
26. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2001).
27. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 662 (1983) (quoting In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40
S.E.C. 907, 912 n.15 (1961)).
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abstain from trading on the confidential information. 28 Historically, the
obligation to disclose arises from "[(1)] the existence of a relationship
affording access to inside information intended to be available only for
a corporate purpose, and [(2)] the unfairness of allowing a corporate
insider to take advantage of that information by trading without
disclosure."29
Insider trading can be prosecuted under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
using two theories: the classical theory and the misappropriation
theory.3" Under the classical theory, corporate insiders are liable when
they trade on the basis of confidential material, nonpublic information
gained by reason of their corporate position.31 In contrast, the misappropriation theory imposes liability on "outsiders" when they trade in
breach of a duty owed to the source of the confidential information.3 2
A.

The Classical Theory
3 the United States Supreme Court
In Chiarella v. United States,"
held that "there can be no fraud [for non-disclosure] absent a duty to
speak"34 and that a duty to disclose under section 10(b) arises from a
relationship of trust and confidence, not from the mere possession of
confidential information.3 5
In clarifying when "tippees" 31 violate
section 10(b), the Court in Dirks v. SEC 37 reaffirmed that a duty arises
from a fiduciary relationship between an insider and a tippee and not
from one's ability to obtain confidential information." Therefore, in
Dirks, the Court held that:

28. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227-28 (1980) (limiting the reach of Cady,
Roberts by explicitly requiring a fiduciary duty between the parties to the transaction
before a violation can occur); ef SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968)
(deciding that all trading while in possession of material information creates a duty to
disclose the confidential information to the other trading party or to abstain from trading).
In Chiarella the Court emphasized that mere possession of confidential information does
not create a duty to abstain from using the confidential information or a duty to disclose
the confidential information to the party with whom the trade on confidential information
is made. 445 U.S. at 227-28.
29. Chiarella,445 U.S. at 227 (citing Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 912 n.15).
30. Yun, 327 F.3d at 1269.
31. United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651-52 (1997).
32. Id.
33. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
34. Id. at 235.
35. Id.
36. A tippee is a person who receives a tip from the tipper, who made the disclosure
of the confidential information.
37. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
38. Id. at 657-58.
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a tippee assumes a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of a corporation
not to trade on material nonpublic information only when [(1)] the
insider has breached his fiduciary duty to the shareholders by
disclosing the information to the tippee and [(2)] the tippee knows or
should know that there has been a breach.39
The Court concluded that not all disclosures are a breach of duty;
therefore, to determine whether the disclosure is a breach, the purpose
of the disclosure must be examined.4 ° The Court held that "the test is
whether the insider personally will benefit, directly or indirectly, from
his disclosure."41
B.

The MisappropriationTheory

In 1997 the Court decided in United States v. O'Hagan42 that the
misappropriation theory could provide a basis for a criminal conviction
under section 10(b)."
The Court characterized the misappropriation
theory as "hold[ing] that a person commits fraud 'in connection with' a
securities transaction, and thereby violates [section] 10(b) ... when [a
person] misappropriates confidential information for securities trading
4
purposes, in breach of a duty owed to the source of the information."
According to the Court, misappropriation is the necessary complement
4s
to the classical theory defined in Chiarella.
Under the misappropriation theory, the section 10(b) deception requirement is met because the
trader deceives the source by not disclosing the scheme to trade
securities to the source of the information.46 The fraud is committed
"in connection with the purchase or sale of [a] security"" because the
fraud is accomplished when the outsider uses the confidential information to purchase or sell securities without disclosing the use of the
information to the insider in breach of a fiduciary or fiduciary-like
4 8
relationship.

39. Id. at 660.
40. Id. at 662.
41. Id.
42. 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
43. Id. at 653.
44. Id. at 652.
45. Id. In Chiarellathe Court determined that corporate insiders could not trade on
confidential information because insiders owe a duty of confidence and trust to the
stockbrokers. 445 U.S. at 227-28.
46. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 653.
47. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2001).
48. 521 U.S. at 655-56.
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1. The Duty of Loyalty and Confidentiality Between Spouses.
To prevail in an insider-trading action, the SEC must first establish that
a breach of loyalty and confidentiality occurred between the misppropriator and the source of the inside information. 49 Historically, business
relationships, such as employer-employee 5° or attorney-client,51 have
provided the requisite duty of loyalty and confidentiality. 2 Conversely,
whether nonbusiness relationships-such as familial and spousal
relationships-provide the requisite duty of loyalty under the misappropriation theory has remained largely unsettled. 3
The mere existence of a family relationship does not provide a basis
to find a confidential relationship.54 To determine whether a fiduciarylike relationship exists, the quality of the relationship matters. 55
Generally, state courts do not find a legally enforceable relationship of
trust and confidence between all family members.56 To presume that
family relationships are fiduciary in nature would conflict with the
Supreme Court's requirement that a pre-existing relationship of trust
and confidence be expressly established.5 7
The leading Rule 10b-5 case defining the existence of a duty of loyalty
and confidentiality in the context of family members is United States V.
Chestman.5" In 1991, in a divided en banc decision, the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals held that (1) entrusting a person with confidential
information does not unilaterally create a fiduciary duty;59 and (2)
marriage alone does not create a relationship of loyalty and confidentiality. o To determine what is required to create a fiduciary relationship
or a similar relationship of trust and confidence, the court looked at
other securities fraud precedents and the common law.61 The court
concluded that a fiduciary relationship involves discretionary authority
and dependency, whereby the beneficiary entrusts the fiduciary with

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
1980).
60.
61.

Id. at 652.
See, e.g., United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1028 (2d Cir. 1986) (en banc).
See, e.g., O'Hagan,521 U.S. at 648.
See, e.g., id.; Carpenter,791 F.2d at 1028.
See, e.g., United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 567 (2d Cir. 1991).
United States v. Reed, 601 F. Supp. 685, 706 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
Id.
See, e.g., Chestman, 947 F.2d at 580.
O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652.
947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991).
Id. at 567; see also Walton v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 623 F.2d 796, 799 (2d Cir.
Chestman, 947 F.2d at 568; see also Reed, 601 F. Supp. at 706.
947 F.2d at 568.
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custody over property.62 Because the fiduciary gains access to the
property to serve the fiduciary relationship, the fiduciary becomes bound
not to appropriate the property for the fiduciary's personal use.63
However, the court established that the repeated disclosure of business
secrets between family members might substitute for a factual finding
of authority and dependency and sustain a finding of a functional
equivalent of a fiduciary relationship for the purpose of section 10(b)
liability."
In Chestman information regarding the sale of a block of the family
company's stock was passed from an insider in the company to other
members of his family.65 Throughout this chain, each recipient of the
information was told to keep the information confidential. Allegedly,
however, the final family member to receive the information, the
insider's niece's husband, told his broker and purchased stock. 6 The
court determined that because the husband did not owe his wife or her
family a fiduciary duty or its functional equivalent, the husband did not
defraud his wife or her family.67 In reversing the broker's (misappropriator's) section 10(b) conviction, 6 the court decided that absent an act
of fraud by the husband (tipper), the broker (alleged misappropriator)
could not be derivatively liable as the husband's tippee.69
The expectation-of-benefit
2. The Expectation of Benefit.
requirement originated in the Supreme Court's decision in Dirks v.
SEC.7 ° In that case, brought under the classical theory of liability, the
Court held that to be guilty of a breach, a tipper would have to intend
to benefit from the disclosure of confidential information to the tippee. 1
The Court noted that the benefit did not have to be pecuniary-a
reputational benefit, a quid pro quo, or even a gift to a friend could
satisfy the requisite expectation of benefit.72

62. Id. at 569.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 555-56. The chain began with Waldbaum, a principal insider, and included
Waldbaum's sister, his niece, and her husband.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 571.
68. Id. In Chestman the misappropriator was the husband's broker.
69. Id.
70. 463 U.S. 646, 662 (1983).
71. Id. The Court also required a breach of duty in a fiduciary relationship and that
the tippee know of that breach before insider-trading liability is imposed. Id. at 660.
72. Id. at 663-64.
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Although under the classical theory of insider-trading liability, the
SEC must show that the tipper had the intent to benefit, directly or
indirectly, from the disclosure of the tip, the issue is not so clearly
resolved under the misappropriation theory.7" Several district courts
have addressed this issue.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals
strongly implied, albeit in dicta, that in misappropriation cases, no need
exists.75 This conflict regarding whether the expectation of benefit is
required remains fundamentally unresolved.76
III.

COURT'S RATIONALE

7

In SEC v. Yun, the Eleventh Circuit held that a jury question
existed as to whether Yun, the wife of a corporate insider, had the
expectation of benefit requisite for insider-trading liability under section
10(b)7 8 when Yun tipped Burch,7" a friend and business associate with
whom she had previously split real estate commissions, by sharing
confidential information she received from her husband."0 In reaching
this result, the Eleventh Circuit first considered whether Yun owed to
her husband a duty of loyalty and confidentiality not to disclose the
information regarding the impending earnings announcement that Yun's
husband had shared. 1
The Eleventh Circuit first held that under Rule 10b-5, the SEC must
establish that the misappropriator breached a fiduciary duty or a similar
duty of loyalty and confidence to the source of the confidential informa-

73. Id. at 662.
74. See, e.g., SEC v. Willis, 777 F. Supp. 1165, 1172 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (noting
disagreement on whether an expectation of benefit is required and stating in dicta that
there is no benefit requirement in misappropriation cases); SEC v. Trikilis, No. CV 921336-RSWL (EEX), 1992 WL 301198, *3 (C.D. Cal. July 28, 1992) vacated on other grounds,
1993 WL 43571 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 1993) (holding that some expectation of benefit is
required).
75. United States v. Libera, 989 F.2d 596, 600 (2d Cir. 1993).
The tipper's knowledge that he or she was breaching a duty to the owner of
confidential information suffices to establish the tipper's expectation that the
breach will lead to some kind of a misuse of the information. This is so because
it may be presumed that the tippee's interest in the information is, in contemporary jargon, not for nothing.
Id.
76. See SEC v. Sargent, 229 F.3d 68, 77 (1st Cir. 2000).
77. 327 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 2003).
78. Id. at 1280.
79. The Eleventh Circuit accepted that the disclosure of confidential information (Yun's
tip to Burch) occurred during the evening of the awards banquet. Id. at 1267, 1268.
80. Id. at 1280.
81. Id. at 1276.
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tion to prevail under a misappropriation theory.82
Following the
8
rationale in United States v. Chestman," the Eleventh Circuit noted
that certain business relationships clearly provide a basis for the
required relationship, while it is less clear whether a nonbusiness,
spousal relationship provides the necessary duty of loyalty and
confidentiality required by the misappropriation theory.84 In Chestman
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals addressed this issue, holding that
either an express agreement of confidentiality or the functional
equivalent of a fiduciary relationship must exist between spouses before
a court may find a duty of loyalty and confidentiality.85 Judge Winter
and four other Second Circuit Judges dissented in Chestman, showing
their dissatisfaction with the narrowness of the majority decision. 8
The dissent noted that "it is inevitable that from time to time normal
familial interactions will lead to the revelation of confidential corporate
matters to various family members" and concluded that a confidential
relationship existed as required by section 10(b).
The Eleventh Circuit accepted the dissent's view in Chestman and
noted that "insisting on either an express agreement of confidentiality
or a strictly defined fiduciary-like relationship, ignore[s] the many
instances in which a spouse has a reasonable expectation of confidentiality."8 The Eleventh Circuit determined that when spouses have a
history of sharing and maintaining business confidences, the spouse who
offers information may have a reasonable expectation of confidence, the
breach of which would subject the breaching spouse to insider-trading
liability.89 Additionally, when a spouse breaches an agreement made
to the other spouse not to disclose the confidential information, this
breach of loyalty and confidence is sufficient to subject the breaching
spouse to insider-trading liability."° The Eleventh Circuit noted that
the decision in Yun effectuates Rule 10b5-2. 9'
In Yun the SEC

82. Id. at 1271; see also Dirks, 463 U.S. 646, 660 (1983).
83. 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991).
84. Yun, 327 F.3d at 1271; see, e.g., Chestman, 947 F.2d at 566.
85. 947 F.2d at 568-69.
86. Id. at 580 (Winter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
87. Id. at 579 (Winter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
88. Yun, 327 F.3d at 1272.
89. Id. at 1273.
90. Id.
91. Id. Rule 10b5-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2 (2002), became effective on August 24,
2000, and defines three nonexclusive situations in which a person has a duty of loyalty and
confidence under the misappropriation theory of insider trading liability. § 240.10b5-2.
The three circumstances are as follows: (1) when a person agrees to maintain a confidence
not to disclose material, nonpublic information; (2) when the recipient of confidential
information has received such information on more than one occasion and the person
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provided sufficient evidence that the Yuns had a history of sharing and
maintaining business confidences, that Yun agreed to keep the
information confidential, and that Yun's husband had a reasonable
expectation the information would be kept confidential.9 2 Therefore,
the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the SEC provided sufficient evidence
to establish that Yun owed her husband a duty of loyalty and confidentiality not to disclose the information regarding the impending earnings
announcement. 93
After holding that Yun had a duty of loyalty to her husband, the
Eleventh Circuit moved to the question of whether Yun breached her
duty of loyalty.94 However, this question could not be determined
without first considering if, under the misappropriation theory of insidertrading liability, the tipper must expect to benefit from the tip.95 As
noted, a number of district courts have given cursory attention to this
issue, and the results vary9
The SEC argued that in Dirks, the tipper-benefit requirement was not
applicable to the misappropriation theory of liability actions because (1)
the expectation-of-benefit requirement is used to establish that a
corporate insider breached a duty to the corporate shareholders, and (2)
in a misappropriation action, the outsider owes no fiduciary or fiduciarylike duty to the corporate shareholders. 97 Consequently, the SEC
asserted that applying the Dirks analysis would be illogical because no
need exists to determine if a breach of duty occurred when the outsiders
never owed a duty to the corporate shareholders. 98 Additionally, the

communicating the information expects that the recipient will keep the information
confidential; or (3) when a person receives confidential information from a spouse or other
immediate family member without owing that person a duty of loyalty or confidence, yet
the person communicating the information expects the information to be kept confidential
and the recipient family member knows or should have known of the expectation of
confidentiality. Id.
92. Yun, 327 F.3d at 1273-74.
93. Id. at 1274.
94. Id.
95. Id. Contrary to the position the SEC took in its complaint, the SEC argued to the
court that proof of an expectation of benefit is not required in this case. Id. Note that the
expectation of benefit originated in the classical theory of insider trading liability. Dirks
v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 662 (1983).
96. See, e.g., United States v. Libera, 989 F.2d 596, 600 (2d Cir. 1993) (implying that
no expectation of benefit is required); SEC v. Willis, 777 F. Supp. 1165, 1172 n.7 (S.D.N.Y.
1991) (stating in dicta that there is no benefit requirement in misappropriation cases); SEC
v. Trikilis, No. CV 92-1336-RSWL (EEX), 1992 WL 301198, *3 (C.D. Cal. July 28, 1992)
vacated on other grounds, 1993 WL 43571 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 1993) (requiring some
expectation of benefit).
97. Yun, 327 F.3d at 1275.
98. Id.
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SEC contended that the expectation of benefit should not be required
under the misappropriation theory because the breach of duty occurs
when the outsider makes the unauthorized tip that harms the principal
and the harm created does not depend upon whether the outsider had
an expectation to benefit from the tip.99
The Eleventh Circuit disagreed primarily because the SEC's position
would construct an "arbitrary fence" between the classical and misappropriation theories of insider-trading liability.' °
Relying on United
States v. O'Hagan,'°' the Eleventh Circuit stated that insider trading
law should be synthesized because the two theories of insider trading are
complementary, and no basis for inconsistency between the two theories
exists.' 2 The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that no need existed to
differentiate a tippee who received confidential information from an
insider 10 3 and a tippee who received such information from an outsider'0 4 because the tippee must have notice that the confidential
information was received through an inappropriate breach of a fiduciary
10 5
or fiduciary-like duty under both theories of insider-trading liability.
Furthermore, the Eleventh Circuit noted that liability does not vary
depending on the theory of prosecution, nor does the harm to the
securities market vary.'
Therefore, the court concluded that an
expectation of benefit is required under both theories of insider-trading

liability. 107
Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit explained that insider-trading
prohibitions are premised on protecting the securities markets from

99. Id. at 1277.
100. Id. at 1275. One of the court's major concerns was that the SEC's approach would
allow precedent regarding the one theory of insider trading liability to be completely
ignored anytime an action was brought under the other theory of insider trading liability.
Id. at 1275-76.
101. 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
102. Yun, 327 F.3d at 1276. "Congress did not intend to create a scheme of law that
depends on the label or theory under which the SEC brings its case." Id. at 1276 n.27.
103. Typically, liability for this situation would be prosecuted under the classical
theory. See O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 651-52.
104. Generally, liability for this circumstance would be prosecuted under the
misappropriation theory. Id.
105. Yun, 327 F.3d at 1276. Here, the Eleventh Circuit is applying the Dirks
requirement that the tippee must have actual or constructive knowledge of the occurrence
of a breach when the tipper made the disclosure of confidential information. Id.; see Dirks,
463 U.S. at 660.
106. Yun, 327 F.3d at 1276.
107. Id. "[F]or better or worse, the Supreme Court has required that the only way to
taint a tippee with liability for insider trading is to find a co-venture with the fiduciary,
and that co-venture exists only if the tipper intends to benefit." Id. (citation omitted)
(relying on Dirks, 463 U.S. at 662).
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fraud." 8 The purpose of section 10(b) is to catch fraudulent means of
capitalizing on confidential information, not to ban all breaches of
fiduciary duty.0 9 The securities laws are not designed to impose
liability on a person who had no intent either to trade or to tip in a
manner that manipulates the market."0 Finally, the Eleventh Circuit
concluded that to adopt the SEC's position not to require the expectation
of benefit in misappropriation theory actions "would impose liability
more readily for tipping than for trading.""' Clearly, this result would
be "absurd" given that the Supreme Court's rationale for imposing the
requirement was to ensure that "a tip rises to the
expectation-of-benefit
2
trade.""
a
of
level
While the Eleventh Circuit did require an expectation of benefit
in this misappropriation-theory case, the showing required to establish
an expectation of benefit was not extensive."' An actual pecuniary
gain is not necessary."4 For example, in this case, the SEC presented
evidence that Yun and Burch were "friendly" and worked together
splitting real estate commissions for several years." 5 Therefore, the
Eleventh Circuit concluded that the evidence was sufficient for a jury to
conclude that Yun had an intent to benefit from her tip to Burch by
maintaining a good relationship between a friend and frequent business
partner."6 Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit determined that *ajury
question existed as to whether Yun and Burch were liable for insider
trading under the misappropriation theory." 7
The Eleventh Circuit affirned the district court's decision in denying
the appellants' motions for judgment as a matter of law;" 8 however,
the Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court's judgment and remanded
the case for new trial because the district court's jury instruction on the
elements of the misappropriation theory of liability were erroneous."'

108. Id. at 1278; see also Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197 (1976).
109. Yun, 327 F.3d at 1278.
110. Id. at 1278-79.
111. Id. at 1279.
112. Id. (citing Dirks, 463 U.S. at 664).
113. Id. at 1280.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1280-81.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1282.
119. Id. Over objections, the district court had instructed the jury as follows: "(1) 'the
SEC must establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Mrs. Yun breached a
fiduciary duty or other duty of trust and confidence to David Yun by disclosing to Mr.
Burch material nonpublic information,' and (2) '[tlhe communication of such information
must be intentional, or severely reckless.'" Id. at 1281. The Eleventh Circuit found that
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IMPLICATIONS

The Exchange Act was enacted to create confidence in the securities
market by eliminating the "'use of inside information for personal
advantage.'"'2 ° In SEC v. Yun,' 2' the Eleventh Circuit continued to
effectuate this purpose by settling two disputed aspects of insidertrading liability.'2 2
A.

The Duty of Loyalty and Confidentiality Between Spouses

By deciding that a duty of loyalty and confidentiality between spouses
may be shown (1) if the spouses have a history or practice of sharing and
maintaining business confidences or (2) if in disclosing the confidential
information the spouse breaches an agreement to maintain the other
spouse's business confidences, 23 the Eleventh Circuit created a split
with the Second Circuit by more broadly defining the spousal duty of
loyalty and confidentiality.124 The Supreme Court is likely to address
this conflict because this inconsistency generates ambiguity as to how
section 10(b) of the Exchange Act should be applied.
The Eleventh Circuit's decision will impose more readily the duty of
loyalty and confidentiality between spouses and possibly other relatives,
which will in turn impose liability more promptly for unlawful tipping.
This decision will further the purpose of the Exchange Act by imposing
liability upon a spouse or family member who defrauds his source by
misusing the confidential information while feigning loyalty.
However, one shortcoming of this decision is that the court does not
explain the requirement in Dirks that the tippee, in this case Burch,
must have notice that the tipper's disclosure of information constitutes
an improper breach of a fiduciary or fiduciary-like duty. In this case,
the requirement in Dirks is less than clearly established. Considering
that the Eleventh Circuit had to decide whether a breach of loyalty and
confidentiality occurred between Yun and her husband, it is not evident

the "severely reckless" instruction prejudiced the defendants because it permitted the jury
to find them liable on the ground that Donna Yun acted with severe recklessness in
disclosing the information, rather than with an intent to benefit personally. Id. at 1281-82.
Thus, the Eleventh Circuit remanded the case for a new trial. Id. at 1282.
120. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 662 (1983) (quoting In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40
S.E.C. 907, 912 n.15 (1961)).
121. 327 F.3d 1263 (l1th Cir. 2003).
122. Id. at 1273-74, 1280.
123. Id. at 1273-74.
124. See id. at 1272. The Second Circuit held that a fiduciary or fiduciary-like
relationship exists when one person is dependent on the other or when one person has
discretionary authority over the other. Chestman, 947 F.2d at 569.
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from the facts that Burch could or should have had notice that the tip
he received was a result of a breach of a fiduciary-like duty.
B.

The Expectation of Benefit

While the Eleventh Circuit created inconsistency with a sister circuit
in expanding the spousal duty of loyalty, the Eleventh Circuit aligned
the two theories of insider-trading liability by requiring the SEC to
prove that the misappropriator expected to benefit from the tip in a
misappropriation theory of insider-trader liability action. 125 In this
case of first impression, the Eleventh Circuit traced the precedents of
insider-trading liability before requiring an expectation of benefit in a
misappropriation action. 128 However, the court determined that the
benefit is sufficient when the tipper is attempting to maintain a good
relationship between a friend and a frequent partner in real estate
deals. 27 In other words, the Eleventh Circuit appears to be restricting
insider-trading liability by requiring another element in misappropriation actions; however, the benefit requirement is so broadly defined that
this restriction may be in appearance only.
Establishing consistency between the two theories of insider-trading
liability will be beneficial because the courts within the Eleventh Circuit
will not determine liability arbitrarily according to varying requirements
depending upon which theory the SEC decides to use to prosecute the
accused. Given the practical reasoning the Eleventh Circuit offered in
deciding this novel issue, other circuits are likely to follow this decision.
M.

125.
126.
127.

Yun, 327 F.3d at 1280.
Id. at 1274-81.
Id. at 1280.
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